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NO. 7 FEBRUARY 2020 Introduction 
Taiwan’s Threatened Democracy 
Stays on Course 
Fear of China’s Dictatorship Pushes Taiwan’s President to a Landslide Victory 
Frédéric Krumbein 
Presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Taiwan on 11 January 2020. 
The island is de facto a sovereign state and a consolidated democracy but is claimed 
by the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, who has been in 
power since 2016, and her Democratic Progress Party (DPP) won both elections by a 
clear majority. The DPP stresses Taiwan’s de facto independence. The largest opposi-
tion party, Kuomintang (KMT), stands for closer economic cooperation with mainland 
China. The election campaign was marked by increasing pressure from Beijing on the 
island and by protests in Hong Kong. Hong Kong serves as a warning to the Taiwanese 
about what could happen if Taiwan becomes too close to the mainland or even merges 
with it: The island state could lose its democracy and freedom. 
 
In the presidential elections in January, 
Tsai received 57.1 percent of the vote, Han 
Kuo-yu from the KMT 38.6 percent, and 
the third candidate, James Soong from the 
People First Party, 4.3 percent. In parlia-
ment, the DPP has lost 7 seats, but with 61 
Members of Parliament, it retains a comfort-
able majority of the total 113 seats. The KMT 
won 38 seats; smaller parties and independ-
ent candidates won the remaining 14 seats. 
The clear election victory for Tsai can be 
explained on the one hand by the fact that 
the KMT sent Han Kuo-yu, a weak presiden-
tial candidate, into the race. On the other 
hand, the electorate trusts the incumbent 
president, rather than the KMT, to protect 
Taiwan’s democracy and freedom from the 
People’s Republic. 
In the parliamentary elections, the dif-
ference in votes between the DPP and the 
KMT was less marked: 6.4 percentage points. 
The seats are allocated through a mixture 
of majority and proportional representation. 
The reasons for the smaller difference in 
votes are, firstly, that some KMT supporters 
did not vote for the unpopular Han, but did 
vote for their party in the parliamentary elec-
tions; secondly, most small parties did not 
nominate their own presidential candidates, 
as there is no run-off vote. This favors a con-
centration of votes on just a few candidates. 
In the parliamentary elections, however, a 
part of the electorate then opted for smaller 
parties and independent candidates. 
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KMT: Strong Start, Weak Finish 
Han has experienced a rapid rise as a poli-
tician during the last one and a half years. 
In November 2018 he was elected mayor 
of Kaohsiung, the largest city in southern 
Taiwan, traditionally a stronghold of the 
ruling DPP. His unconventional and people-
oriented manner, his image as a political 
outsider, and his promise to make Kaoh-
siung rich led many people to vote for him. 
Almost as fast as his meteoric rise was his 
fall – burning out after coming into con-
tact with political and economic reality. 
Han is a classic populist who had promised 
a lot, but in the end was unable to keep 
his promises for Kaohsiung, instead “dis-
tinguishing himself” through the chaotic 
management of the city. In addition, there 
were private scandals, for example an issue 
concerning a luxury apartment, that dam-
aged his image as a “man of the people.” 
Shortly after he won the KMT party prima-
ries in July 2019, his decline in the polls 
began. 
Internal conflicts within the KMT and 
the “blue camp” of KMT and smaller parties 
close to it contributed to his poor election 
results. One of the veterans of Taiwanese 
politics, 77-year-old James Soong, ran for 
president for the fourth time, supported 
by Terry Gou, founder of Apple supplier 
Foxconn and one of the richest men on 
the island. Soong also stands for a stronger 
rapprochement with mainland China and 
belongs to the “blue camp.” Gou himself 
was defeated by Han in the KMT prelimi-
nary election polls and then resigned from 
the KMT. He and Soong disputed Han’s 
competence to govern Taiwan. Even parts 
of the elite of the KMT had little use for the 
popular Han. 
Mobilization for the DPP and a 
New “Third Force” 
In contrast, the “green camp” around Presi-
dent Tsai has shown itself to be united. Al-
though she had to compete with her former 
prime minister, William Lai, in the DPP’s 
internal party primaries, she was able to 
assert herself as a candidate. After being 
defeated, Lai called for support for the 
president and was nominated by her as a 
candidate for the office of vice president. 
In addition, the “green camp” was able 
to mobilize its electorate, including the 
younger generation. Voter turnout in the 
presidential elections was 74.9 percent, 
significantly higher than four years ago, 
when it was 66.3 percent. 
With the “Taiwan People’s Party,” a 
third force – the “white” force – has 
finally entered the political stage alongside 
the “blue” and “green” forces. Founded by 
the mayor of Taipei, Ko Wen-je, the party 
wants to govern unideologically, pragmati-
cally, and efficiently – it sees itself as a 
force between the “blue” and “green” camps. 
The party will have only five seats in the 
newly elected parliament; however, in the 
19 constituencies in which it has been 
elected, it has achieved more than 5 percent 
of the vote almost everywhere – in one-
third of the constituencies even more than 
10 percent. It is widely believed that Ko will 
run for president in 2024. His lack of ideol-
ogy and his deliberately open political posi-
tions, for example on relations with main-
land China, are both his strength and his 
weakness. 
Today Hong Kong, 
Tomorrow Taiwan? 
Apart from the “candidate question,” the 
second main reason for Tsai’s election vic-
tory is the fact that Taiwan’s relationship 
with mainland China overshadowed other 
issues in the election. 
On 2 January 2019, President Xi Jinping 
reaffirmed in a keynote address on Taiwan 
that a union of the mainland with Taiwan 
is inevitable, if necessary by force. It should 
be carried out under the formula “one coun-
try, two systems,” which provides that 
territories within the People’s Republic of 
China can have a partially independent 
political system. The “one country, two sys-
tems” concept was developed 40 years ago 
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by Deng Xiaoping for Taiwan and later ap-
plied to Hong Kong and Macau. Although 
the People’s Republic did not name a dead-
line for unification with Taiwan, Xi stressed 
that this issue should not be passed on from 
generation to generation. The unspoken 
end date is (at the latest) the year 2049: Ac-
cording to Xi, the “great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation” is to be completed on the 
occasion of the country’s centennial anni-
versary – and this includes unification 
with Taiwan. 
In Taiwan “one country, two systems” 
was, and is, rejected by the overwhelming 
majority of the population, as well as by all 
parties in parliament. Since Taiwan is de 
facto a sovereign state, the island republic 
can only lose under this concept. 
The political line of conflict on Taiwan is 
different: between the ideal of an independ-
ent Taiwan, for which the DPP stands, and 
the ideal of a united democratic China, the 
Republic of China, which the KMT is striv-
ing for. The Republic of China was founded 
in 1912 and ended the Chinese Empire. It 
was ruled dictatorially by the KMT until the 
KMT was defeated by the Chinese Commun-
ist Party (CCP) in the Chinese Civil War and 
had to flee to Taiwan in 1949. The Republic 
of China still exists there today. Taiwan 
was successfully democratized in the 1990s. 
Neither the ideals of the DPP nor the KMT 
are currently attainable. Accordingly, the 
major parties are making efforts to main-
tain the status quo, that is, Taiwan’s de 
facto independence: the DPP through closer 
ties to the United States and greater distance 
from mainland China, the KMT through 
close economic ties to mainland China. 
In Taiwan, Xi’s speech was perceived as 
a hardening of the position toward Taiwan, 
even if Xi essentially only reaffirmed the 
existing positions of the People’s Republic 
on this issue. However, in his speech, he 
missed the opportunity to present new 
options for a solution to the conflict that 
would also be acceptable to Taiwan. 
A turning point for the election cam-
paign in Taiwan was the resurgence of the 
democracy movement in Hong Kong. It 
reached its first climax in June 2019 in a 
peaceful protest march with up to 2 million 
people. 
The protests had been sparked by the 
planned passing of an extradition law. The 
draft law provided that criminals wanted in 
mainland China could be extradited there. 
Many Hong Kong citizens feared that the 
law could be misused to extradite people 
there to the People’s Republic who were 
critical of it. One of Hong Kong’s most im-
portant achievements compared with main-
land China is the largely intact rule of law. 
In mainland China, the judiciary has to 
bow to the instructions of the CCP in cases 
of doubt, which does not meet the stand-
ards of the rule of law. Protests in Hong 
Kong have quickly developed into a move-
ment against the gradual erosion of the 
city’s remaining freedoms by the People’s 
Republic. 
The situation in Hong Kong has made 
one thing above all clear to the Taiwanese: 
the considerably lower level of democratic 
freedoms under the “one country, two sys-
tems” concept compared to Taiwan. In 
addition, the central government in Beijing 
and the local government in Hong Kong 
have shown themselves to be uncompro-
mising; the only concession made was the 
withdrawal of the controversial extradition 
law in September 2019. The other four de-
mands of the protest movement have been, 
and are still being, ignored: 
1) the introduction of free and general 
elections, 
2) an independent investigation into police 
violence, 
3) an amnesty for all accused protesters and 
the release of detainees, and 
4) the demand that the protests not be char-
acterized as riots. 
Instead, the police reacted with harsh-
ness and brutality and have arrested several 
thousand protesters to date, many of them 
students. There have been numerous reports 
of the mistreatment of detainees. A small 
part of the protest movement has radical-
ized itself and committed violence against 
the police, whereas the vast majority re-
main peaceful and have the support of the 
Hong Kong people. On the one hand, the 
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People’s Republic insists on the “one coun-
try, two systems” formula for Taiwan. On 
the other hand, the Taiwanese see that – 
compared to their democracy – even the 
much more limited democratic freedoms 
and rights in Hong Kong are being under-
mined by the CCP. 
Tsai has stressed in several speeches and 
statements that Taiwan’s democracy is non-
negotiable and that “one country, two sys-
tems” is not an acceptable solution. She 
also expressed her solidarity with Hong 
Kong’s democracy movement. At the same 
time, however, she avoided granting asylum 
to a larger number of protesters or other-
wise offering support for the protest move-
ment in order not to provoke mainland 
China. The KMT also rejects “one country, 
two systems,” and Han said during the 
election campaign that this concept would 
only be applied in Taiwan “over his dead 
body.” But the majority of Taiwanese fear 
that mainland China could expand its 
political influence if there were closer eco-
nomic cooperation, as envisaged in Han’s 
election platform. 
Solid Economic Development 
President Tsai’s first term in office was 
marked by sound economic management, 
democratic progress in Taiwan, difficult 
relations with mainland China, and close 
ties with the United States, Japan, and the 
European Union (EU). 
The Taiwanese economy has grown 
steadily during Tsai’s first term, averaging 
2.5 percent per year from 2016 to 2019. 
With the reductions in pensions for civil 
servants, it has pushed through an impor-
tant – albeit unpopular – reform for the 
financial sustainability of the social welfare 
systems. Many Taiwanese are dissatisfied 
above all with the almost two decades of 
stagnating wages and the simultaneous 
sharp rise in property prices. The president 
has not yet been able to solve this problem. 
This is one of the reasons why the DPP suf-
fered a crushing defeat in the local elec-
tions in November 2018, with Tsai resign-
ing as party leader as a result. The focus in 
the election campaign on relations with 
mainland China, the protests in Hong Kong, 
and the disenchantment with Han helped 
Tsai to make a comeback in 2019. In addi-
tion, she has raised the minimum wage 
several times, implemented tax cuts, and 
taken other social policy measures, which 
has enabled her to regain her popularity. 
Taiwan’s Exemplary Democracy 
Under Tsai, Taiwan has made further pro-
gress in the areas of democracy and human 
rights. For example, the rights of Taiwan’s 
16 officially recognized indigenous peoples 
have been strengthened. In 2016, Tsai be-
came the first president of the island state 
to apologize for injustices committed in the 
treatment of indigenous Taiwanese, who 
make up about 2 percent of the population. 
In addition, the authoritarian past was 
dealt with by setting up a commission to 
investigate the period of the KMT dictator-
ship from 1945 until the complete abolition 
of martial law in 1992 and to compensate 
victims. Germany’s reappraisal of the Ger-
man Democratic Republic (GDR) dictator-
ship serves as a model for this; in December 
2019, a declaration of intent was signed to 
facilitate cooperation with the Agency for 
the Records of the State Security Service of 
the former GDR. 
In 2019, Taiwan was the first country in 
Asia to introduce same-sex marriage. The 
island state is one of the continent’s front-
runners in terms of freedom of expression 
and religion, women’s rights, LGBTQ* rights, 
and freedom for civil society. Direct democ-
racy has been developed in the form of sim-
plified referendum procedures. Together 
with Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is the 
most developed democracy in Asia and 
the only Chinese democracy that has ever 
existed. 
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Turbulent Relations with China 
After her election in 2016, Tsai promised 
to maintain the status quo in relations with 
mainland China. In her inaugural speech, 
she acknowledged the historical signifi-
cance of the talks between the two sides in 
1992 without fully embracing the concept 
of the “1992 Consensus,” which goes back 
to an informal agreement between the CCP 
and the KMT: Although there is one China, 
there are different interpretations of which 
state precisely this one China was. The CCP 
means the People’s Republic of China, the 
KMT the Republic of China. Central from 
the CCP’s point of view is the recognition 
that Taiwan is a part of China, although 
not necessarily the People’s Republic. 
The DPP has never accepted this concept 
and takes the view that the Taiwanese 
people must decide on Taiwan’s sovereignty. 
In her inaugural speech, Tsai went a long 
way toward accommodating mainland China 
by explicitly mentioning the 1992 talks. 
She had not received a mandate for fur-
ther steps toward integration with main-
land China. She did, however, leave in force 
the 21 agreements that had been ratified 
by the KMT with mainland China under her 
predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, which primarily 
concern economic integration. She rejects 
demands for Taiwanese independence, as 
raised by the radical wing of her party. 
For Xi’s government, however, Tsai’s 
inaugural speech and its policies offered 
too little: The People’s Republic demands 
the recognition of the “1992 Consensus” 
and further steps toward integration with 
the aim of uniting Taiwan with the main-
land under the formula “one country, two 
systems.” As a consequence, Beijing broke 
off all contact with the government in Tai-
pei after Tsai assumed office in May 2016. 
“Hide a Dagger behind a Smile” – 
China’s Taiwan Politics 
After the breakdown of relations, the 
People’s Republic pursued a double strat-
egy of “carrot and stick” toward Taiwan. On 
the one hand, it adopted the “31 measures” 
in 2018 and a further “26 measures” in 2019 
to create incentives for Taiwanese workers 
and companies to work and invest in main-
land China; among other things, Taiwanese 
workers and companies were put on an 
equal footing with mainland Chinese in 
many areas. Apparently, these measures 
have not yet had the desired effect – in-
vestments by Taiwanese companies on the 
mainland have been declining since 2016. 
However, mainland China remains the 
largest market outside Taiwan for Taiwan-
ese workers and companies, with around 
1 million Taiwanese working there. 
On the other hand, the People’s Republic 
has put Taiwan under a lot of pressure. 
Firstly, warships and fighter jets regularly 
circle the island. In addition, Taiwan is the 
victim of an estimated 15 million cyber-
attacks per month from the People’s Repub-
lic. 
Secondly, the People’s Republic of China 
has further restricted Taiwan’s already lim-
ited international scope. Since 2016, the 
People’s Republic has persuaded seven states 
to recognize the People’s Republic diplo-
matically instead of the Republic of China. 
This means that Taiwan is now officially 
recognized as a state by only 15 countries, 
in Europe only by the Holy See. Pressure is 
being exerted on international companies 
to add the word “China” whenever Taiwan 
is mentioned: In 2018, for example, more 
than 30 airlines were prompted to change 
“Taiwan” to “Taiwan, China” on their web-
sites. Most of them complied with the re-
quest so as not to jeopardize their presence 
on the mainland Chinese market. 
Thirdly, the People’s Republic exerts 
influence on the media in Taiwan. One 
strategy is to buy up media companies in 
Taiwan through China-friendly entrepre-
neurs, who then spread the propaganda of 
the People’s Republic. An example of this 
is the China Times of Taiwanese “cookie 
tycoon” Tsai Eng-meng, who makes most of 
his profits on the mainland. The China Times 
and other “red media” apparently receive 
direct instructions from Beijing on how and 
what they should report on. Another strat-
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egy is to use social media to spread misinfor-
mation. With the help of fake accounts, 
social media increases the popularity of 
pro-Chinese politicians in Taiwan. For 
example, Han owes his rapid rise to hun-
dreds of thousands of fake users on Face-
book, inflating his popularity in fan groups. 
Taiwan’s democracy is probably the 
world’s biggest victim of the “sharp power” 
of the People’s Republic, a form of destruc-
tive power that seeks to undermine the 
attractiveness and legitimacy of a political 
system. The aim is to weaken the Taiwanese 
government and divide Taiwanese society 
through misinformation, propaganda, 
threats, and subversion. 
Taiwan Strengthens 
Its Own Resilience 
In response to growing pressure from main-
land China, the government of Tsai has 
strengthened Taiwan’s resilience. Planned 
defense spending for 2020 has been raised 
to $13.1 billion, compared to $10.7 billion 
in 2015. The development and construction 
of its own submarines is boosting the 
domestic defense industry. 
The parliament has passed several laws 
against mainland Chinese influence on 
media and politics, the last measure being 
the “Anti-Infiltration Law” at the end of 
December 2019. Among other things, these 
laws prohibit Taiwanese parties from ac-
cepting money from the People’s Republic 
and tighten restrictions on retired officials 
and soldiers from participating in CCP 
activities on the Chinese mainland. 
The Tsai government is also working 
to reduce economic dependence on main-
land China. To this end, it has initiated the 
“New Southbound Policy,” which aims to 
strengthen economic, cultural, and social 
relations with South and Southeast Asia. 
For example, the inhabitants of many of 
these states can now enter Taiwan without 
a visa, which has led to an increase in tour-
ism from these regions. In addition, more 
and more travelers are coming from Japan 
and South Korea. In 2019, Taiwan set a new 
record for visitors, with 11.8 million people. 
In tourism, Taiwan’s government has suc-
ceeded in reducing its dependence on main-
land China. Although the mainland Chinese 
are still the largest group, with 2.7 million 
people in 2019, under Tsai’s predecessor, 
President Ma, there were still 4.1 million at 
the peak of 2015, with 10.4 million visitors 
in total. The situation is more difficult for 
exports: Mainland China and Hong Kong 
remain by far the largest export markets for 
the island state, with a combined export 
share of around 40 percent, far ahead of the 
United States (12 percent) and Japan (7 per-
cent). This share of around 40 percent has 
remained largely stable for 15 years. It will 
take a lot of patience and determination to 
reduce Taiwan’s close economic ties with 
mainland China. 
After all, Taiwan’s government is count-
ing on intensive relations with other devel-
oped democracies, first and foremost with 
the United States, but also with Japan and 
the EU. Both sides consider relations be-
tween the United States and Taiwan to be 
very good. For example, the United States 
passed the “Taiwan Travel Act” in 2018, 
which allows meetings at the government 
level. Both houses of Congress unanimously 
adopted the law, a signal of the cross-party 
and visible support Taiwan enjoys in the 
United States. In the same year, the United 
States opened a new large building in 
Taipei for its unofficial representation, the 
American Institute. 
The United States is sending warships 
through the Taiwan Strait more frequently 
than in the past and regularly sells weapons 
to Taiwan. The last major package, agreed 
in 2019, provides for the sale of 66 F-16 
fighter aircraft of the latest generation. 
In two high-profile speeches on US policy 
toward China, delivered in October 2018 
and 2019, respectively, US Vice President 
Mike Pence made positive statements about 
Taiwan; both times he said, “America will 
always believe that Taiwan’s embrace of 
democracy shows a better path for all the 
Chinese people.” 
US policy is to maintain the status quo in 
the Taiwan Strait. They are signaling to the 
 SWP Comment 7 
 February 2020 
 7 
People’s Republic that they are supporting 
Taiwan in order to prevent mainland mili-
tary actions against the island. If the pres-
sure of the People’s Republic on Taiwan 
increases further, the United States will 
probably be forced to make an even stronger 
commitment to defend the island state if 
it wants to prevent military actions by the 
People’s Republic. 
Taiwan’s relations with Japan and the EU 
have also developed in a positive manner 
during Tsai’s first term of office. Japan has 
traditionally maintained close relations 
with the DPP. The EU regards the human 
rights situation in Taiwan as being exem-
plary in Asia and bases bilateral relations 
on shared values and good economic 
relations. 
Threat to Taiwan Increases 
For President Tsai’s second term of office, a 
continuation of her policy of the past four 
years is expected. 
As far as relations with mainland China 
are concerned, much depends on the gov-
ernment in Beijing. One option would be 
for the People’s Republic to maintain, or 
even increase, the pressure on Taiwan, and 
a second option would be for it to change 
its policy on Taiwan in favor of more dia-
logue and compromise. This second pos-
sibility seems unlikely at present. It would, 
however, be the prerequisite for peaceful 
unification, which is the publicly expressed 
goal of the government in Beijing. 
In her speech on election evening in 
2020, President Tsai again emphasized her 
willingness to engage in dialogue and 
understanding with the mainland. The 
basis must be a commitment to peace and 
the renunciation of threats, a dialogue based 
on mutual respect and parity, and respect 
for the democratic will of the Taiwanese. 
The Taiwanese must be allowed to decide 
on their own future in a democratic process. 
The harsh attitude of the People’s Repub-
lic over the last four years has been coun-
terproductive and has further alienated 
Taiwan from the mainland. Thus, Beijing’s 
policy has weakened the KMT. The party’s 
problem is that it wants to continue the poli-
cies of President Ma (2008–2016). In doing 
so, it overlooks the fact that the People’s 
Republic is not the same today as it was 10 
years ago, but rather that it is more aggres-
sive and demanding toward Taiwan while 
becoming more repressive at home. More-
over, the KMT has hardly any voters under 
the age of 40 because they do not identify 
with the Republic of China and usually see 
themselves exclusively as Taiwanese. The 
comparatively solid performance of the 
KMT in the parliamentary elections shows, 
however, that with suitable – young – 
personnel and new ideas, the party can 
become competitive again. 
Initial reactions from the People’s Repub-
lic indicate that it is continuing its policy 
of putting pressure on Taiwan and sticking 
to the “one country, two systems” formula. 
The repression by the CCP in Tibet, Xin-
jiang, and Hong Kong demonstrates its lack 
of ability to compromise and grant political 
freedom. In current Chinese politics, it is 
also less risky for politicians to adopt a 
tough and nationalistic stance than to be 
willing to compromise and be open to new 
ideas and concepts. Accordingly, the People’s 
Republic will continue to try to infiltrate 
Taiwan’s democracy and spread misinfor-
mation as well as increase military and 
diplomatic pressure. 
EU: Safeguarding the Status 
Quo and Supporting Taiwan’s 
Democracy 
The most recent strategy paper on EU–
China relations of March 2019 characterizes 
bilateral relations in this way: cooperation, 
balancing mutual interests, competition, 
and rivalry in terms of values and political 
systems. Taiwan only appears in a footnote. 
Following on from the EU Strategy Paper of 
2016, the Union is basing its relations with 
Taiwan on the “One China Policy,” the fur-
ther development of relations with Taiwan 
on the basis of shared values, and peace in 
the Taiwan Strait. 
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The Union’s most recent strategy paper 
illustrates the tensions in relations in which 
it finds itself with the People’s Republic. 
On the one hand, China is an economic and 
political partner in trade and investment 
as well as the solution for global problems 
such as climate protection; on the other 
hand, the People’s Republic is a rival that 
propagates an authoritarian model of gov-
ernment and undermines global norms 
such as human rights. 
European policy toward Taiwan also finds 
itself in this area of tension. The island 
state shares European values of democracy 
and human rights. As with the support for 
human rights defenders in mainland China 
and Hong Kong or taking action concerning 
the repression of people in Xinjiang and 
Tibet, the EU must consider what it values 
in its relations with Taiwan in promoting 
democracy and human rights. The planned 
EU–China summit in Germany in Septem-
ber 2020 is an appropriate time for such a 
discussion on a “Taiwan strategy.” 
In addition, EU member states should 
engage more with the United States and 
Japan on how to maintain peace and sta-
bility in the Taiwan Strait and how the 
world’s democracies can better support one 
of their own. 
There are many opportunities for co-
operation with Taiwan below the level of 
formal state recognition from which both 
sides could benefit and which can be in-
tensified: in technology and science, the 
energy revolution, and the promotion of 
human rights. In Germany and Europe, 
Taiwan is not sufficiently understood as 
the valuable partner it is – as a successful 
democracy and a technologically innovative 
economy. Its IT industry, for example, is 
one of the world’s most advanced. 
At the same time, the EU could offer to 
organize dialogues and conferences involv-
ing itself, mainland China, and Taiwan. 
These dialogues should, among other things, 
try to make mainland China more under-
standing of Taiwan’s democracy and values. 
Tsai’s election victory, for example, is ex-
plained by Chinese media as being the 
result of the fraud and dirty tricks of the 
DPP and the influence of the United States, 
without giving any facts or evidence. Tai-
wan’s democracy is only “a coat under 
which the forces of Taiwanese independ-
ence hide,” as a professor from the People’s 
Republic said at a recent conference in 
Shanghai. Just as with the situation in Hong 
Kong, Beijing cannot imagine that people 
want to live in freedom. 
Dr Frédéric Krumbein is Heinrich Heine Visiting Professor at Tel Aviv University. 
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